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LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AFTER WEDE 
V. NICHE MARKETING 
Joseph Stanier Manning* 
Louisiana’s approach to public records doctrine is muddy and 
largely the result of historical accident; the Louisiana State Law 
Institute and Louisiana legislature have amended the civil code 
intending to reform this body of law, but the courts have not 
recognized this reform and interpret the new codal text in ways 
that yield no new substantive change in the law. Beginning in 
1992, the Louisiana legislature revised the Civil Code, which 
created Titles 22 and 22-A. Some commentators interpreted these 
revisions as an attempt to change the law of recordation 
completely. In 2010, the Wede v. Niche Marketing case made its 
way to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the case was decided in 
such a way that the apparent changes in the law made by the 
revisions were given no effect.1 Wede tells us that the law of public 
records doctrine has not changed since the addition of Titles 22 
and 22-A, but the case also illustrates the problems that arise by 
keeping two separate sets of land records – one for mortgages and 
one for conveyances. If this arbitrary distinction were removed, it 
is likely that the Wede case would have been decided in a way that 
would have given effect to the apparent changes in the revisions. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Candidate, Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, 
LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center (2013); B.A. (hons.), Paul Tulane College, 
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 1. Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, No. 51406, 2008 WL 5770634 (La. 
Dist. Ct. November 25, 2008), rev’d, 09-146 (La. App. 5. Cir. 12/29/09); 30 So. 
3d 145, aff’d, 2010-0243 (La. 11/30/10); 52 So. 3d 60 (2010). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
In Wede, a money judgment was filed in the parish records to 
create a judicial mortgage on all immovables that the defendant-
debtor owned in that parish. Because the Clerk of Court’s office no 
longer kept physical records, the judgment was scanned 
electronically. When the document was scanned, the Deputy Clerk 
handling the document, instead of electronically marking it “MO” 
for mortgage documents, electronically marked it “CO” for 
conveyance documents. Because of this mistake, the judgment 
would not show up in any mortgage searches made by means of 
the computer system. 
Before the Clerk’s Office realized and corrected its mistake, 
the debtor sold some of his encumbered immovable property. The 
judgment creditor then moved to seize that property from the third-
parties who had bought it, insisting that its judicial mortgage was 
in evidence in the parish records when the sale took place despite 
the Deputy Clerk’s computer errors. 
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
The district court, applying Louisiana Civil Code article 3347 
ruled for the judgment creditor.2 The article states in full:  
The effect of recordation arises when an instrument is filed 
with the recorder and is unaffected by subsequent errors or 
omissions of the recorder. An instrument is filed with a 
recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office.3 
The court found the mistake to be one of misindexing on the 
part of the Clerk's office rather than one of misrecording. Though 
the court acknowledged that third-parties should be able to rely on 
the public records, the court also pointed out that the indices are 
not part of the public records. To the trial court, this meant the 
                                                                                                             
 2. Id. 
 3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3347 (2012). 
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recording was valid and that the clerk's mistake did not have any 
adverse effect on the judicial mortgage.  
The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court both 
disagreed with the district court that this was an indexing error. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court echoed the circuit court’s reasoning 
by reading Civil Code article 3347 alongside Civil Code article 
3338.4 The Supreme Court held that, while article 3347 describes 
“when” a document must be recorded, it is article 3338 that 
addresses “where” a document must be recorded.5 The Supreme 
Court held that because the document was listed as "CO" rather 
than "MO," it had been filed in the conveyance records rather than 
the mortgage records. And because it was filed in the wrong set of 
records, it was not properly recorded and did not affect third-
parties. 
III. COMMENTARY 
 Among the jurisdictions within the United States, there is a 
majority and a minority approach regarding how to deal with 
public records. “The majority view is that a person who files a 
document . . . is protected if the instrument is delivered to the 
proper recording official. . . .”6 Under this approach the filer is 
legally protected despite any recording errors later – even if the 
instrument is never actually recorded at all.7 On the other hand, the 
minority jurisdictions hold an instrument must be recorded to be 
effective.8 Louisiana has historically fallen within the minority 
camp, and this case further cements Louisiana’s position among 
those jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                             
 4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3338 (2012). 
 5. Wede, 52 So. 3d 60, n.9 at 65. 
 6. ALEJANDRO M. GARRO, LOUISIANA PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE AND 
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 218–219 (Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications 
Institute, Baton Rouge, 1989). 
 7. Id. at 219. 
 8. Id. 
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For most of Louisiana legal history, the Louisiana law of 
recordation has lacked “a unified and coherent legislative 
framework.”9 Indeed, “the statutory provisions specifying . . . 
when the act of recordation was deemed to be complete 
contradicted one another.”10 This unruly approach came about 
largely through accident.11 “Louisiana law historically has always 
distinguished between filing and recordation.”12 It also 
distinguished and treated separately “the recordation of mortgages 
and that of conveyances.”13 For example, “[c]onveyances were 
always deemed effective upon filing, even if not recorded, while 
mortgages were effective only upon recordation.”14 Also, rather 
than recording all land documents together like most jurisdictions, 
Louisiana record offices keep a distinct set of records for 
conveyances and a distinct set of records for mortgages.15 
Over the past century the legislature made several attempts to 
remedy these discrepancies.16 For example, Act 215 of 1910, 
codified as Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5141, was passed to make 
mortgages effective against third-parties at the time of filing.17 
This would have brought the way mortgages were deemed to be 
effective into line with the way conveyances were treated. Even so, 
this legislative intent was “not recognized by the jurisprudence.”18 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 246. 
 10. Id. at 247. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Michael H. Rubin & Stephen P. Strohchein, Security Devices, 55 LA. L. 
REV. 611, 615 (1995). 
 13. GARRO, supra note 6, at 245. 
 14. Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615. 
 15. The Wede case is rooted in the fact that these distinct sets of records are 
kept. Although the judgment-creditor’s mortgage did indeed get recorded, the 
problem was that it was incorrectly recorded in an arbitrarily defined set of land 
records. If nothing else, this case illustrates the folly of keeping separate records 
for conveyances and mortgages for no reason other than historical accident.  
 16. GARRO, supra note 6, at 276–282 (discussing a thoroughly researched 
history of these attempts as well as the various outcomes of each attempt). 
 17. Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall Grodner, Security Devices, 53 LA. L. 
REV. 969, 1002 (1993); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 615; GARRO, 
supra note 6, at 279. 
 18. Id., Rubin & Grodner at 1002.  
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Instead of ruling that mortgages become effective immediately 
upon filing, the courts made mortgage instruments effective 
retroactive to the time of filing only if they were actually placed in 
the records within a reasonable time after the filing.19  
This was the state of the law until 1992 when the Louisiana 
State Law Institute, recognizing the law’s haphazard approach to 
registry, decided to fully systematize and integrate the public 
records law. This systemization was put into effect by the 
Louisiana Legislature through Act 652 of 1991 and Act 169 of 
2005, which gave rise to Title 22 and Title 22-A respectively, in 
Book III of the Civil Code. Notably, one of the amendments to the 
Civil Code that came about through these revisions was article 
3347. A plain reading suggested that in all instances a record 
would become effective against third parties at the time of filing 
without regard to later errors.20 For these reasons, this article at 
first glance appeared to rewrite the recordation law so that 
Louisiana would join the majority view described above.  
While the earlier rule, as noted above, was that an instrument’s 
effectiveness arose retroactive to filing provided that actual 
recordation later occurred, this new provision’s language seemed 
to put forward rather plainly that any “effect” that comes from 
“recordation” arises when an instrument is “filed,” without regard 
to any later errors on the part of the recorder. The new article goes 
on to specify that an instrument is “filed” when the instrument is 
accepted by the recorder.   
Of the three courts that rendered judgment in the Wede case 
only one – the trial court – adopted this “plain meaning” reading of 
the article. The Louisiana Supreme Court, by contrast, specifically 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id.; GARRO, supra note 6, at 280 (explaining the now irrelevant 
constitutional reasons behind this rule); Rubin & Strohchein, supra note 12, at 
615 (citing Kennibrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 154 So. 2d 433 (La. 1963) and 
Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. App. 1929)). 
 20. Generally this is the tentative rule that was being taught to students by 
Louisiana law professors since the legislation was passed and at least up until 
the Wede court delivered this decision. 
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rejected this reading. According to that court, article 3347, rather 
than answering the question “what must be done in the way of 
filing and recordation” in its entirety, answers only the “when” part 
of the question. Alongside this part of the question, the court 
reasoned, there is also a “where” part. According to the court, the 
“where” part of the question is answered in article 3338. So, under 
article 3347 “recordation” occurs when an instrument is “filed,” 
but according to the Louisiana Supreme Court interpretation of 
article 3338 any recordation is “without effect . . . unless the 
instrument is registered by recording it in the appropriate mortgage 
or conveyance records.” 
 But what effect, if any, did the Supreme Court give to the 
language of article 3347 stating that a recording’s effectiveness is 
“unaffected by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder?” In 
a footnote, the court explained that it was unnecessary to describe 
“what might be included within the complete spectrum” of that 
phrase.21 The court did, however, declare that the error of “placing 
an instrument outside of the mortgage records and into the 
conveyance records” could not be the kind of error contemplated, 
because otherwise the article would conflict with article 3338.22 
Justifying this interpretation, the court referred to its 
jurisprudential rule not to interpret statutes as in conflict with one 
another but rather to reconcile perceived inconsistencies. 
 Since the revisions to the Civil Code adding Titles 22 and 
22-A, Wede has been the only case decided that tells us whether 
there was effective legislative reform in this area of law. From 
Wede we learn that the change in the Louisiana public records 
from the minority view to the majority view that some observers 
believed had been accomplished by legislative revision was 
illusory. It remains the case that in Louisiana a mortgage 
instrument must be actually placed in the correct set of records – 
the mortgage records – to be considered “recorded.” Only then is 
                                                                                                             
 21. Wede, 52 So. 3d, n.10 at 65. 
 22. Id. 
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this recordation effective against third parties (albeit retroactively 
to the original time of filing). This is the same law as Louisiana 
had before 1992. In this regard, Wede informs us that no change 
has taken place in this crucial element of the Louisiana public 
records doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court reached its result 
by focusing intently on “where” land records are filed – with the 
mortgages or conveyances. Louisiana does not need to maintain 
two separate sets of records. Removing this arbitrary distinction 
between mortgage records and conveyance records will go a long 
way toward improving Louisiana public records doctrine. 
 
